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 Abstract: The Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions was agreed upon with an overwhelming majority and after 
the swiftest ratification process in the history of the UNESCO entered into force 
on 18 March 2007. Now, five years later and with some 130 Members committed 
to implementing the convention, not only observers with a particular interest in 
the topic but also the broader public may be eager to know what has happened 
and in how far has the implementation progress advanced. This is the question 
that animates this article. It seeks to answer it by giving a brief background to the 
UNESCO Convention, clarifying its legal status and impact, as well as by looking at 
the current implementation activities in domestic and international contexts. The 
article sets this analysis in the frame of international regime complexity insights. 
 The  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
adopted in 2005 the first legally binding international instrument on culture. 
The Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions  1   was agreed upon with an overwhelming majority of 148 states, with only 
the United States and Israel voting against it.  2  After the swiftest ratification process 
in the history of UNESCO, the convention entered into force on 18 March 2007, 
and more than 120 countries have now ratified it.  3  This incredible success in inter-
national law making, and on an issue as controversial as culture, makes not only 
observers with a particular interest in the topic but also the broader public eager to 
know what has happened five years since the convention’s entry into force—now 
that the rhetorical elation of the early days has settled and the ratifying members 
should have moved on with the implementation. This is the question that ani-
mates this article and that it seeks to answer by giving a brief background to the 
UNESCO Convention, clarifying its legal and political status and impact, and 
looking at the current progress made in its implementation. 
 * Senior research fellow and lecturer in law at the University of Bern . Email:  mira.burri@wti.org . 
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 1.  PUTTING THE UNESCO CONVENTION ON CULTURAL DIVERSITY 
INTO CONTEXT 
 The UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity can be seen as the culmination of 
some previous, mostly exhortatory acts  4  in the fields of culture and trade,  5  and of 
cultural heritage.  6  More broadly and also more pertinently, the convention should 
be perceived as a reaction to the process of economic globalization and in partic-
ular to the emergence of enforceable multilateral trade rules through the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). The UNESCO Convention was intended to provide a 
counterbalance to this high level of institutionalization of economic regulation and 
to cater to noneconomic objectives that states might wish to pursue, in particular 
in the field of culture.  7  
 The actual text of the convention hardly lives up to this ambitious goal. The 
convention’s drawbacks can be grouped into three categories, relating to (1) the 
lack of binding obligations, (2) its substantive incompleteness, and (3) its ambiguous 
relation towards other international instruments. 
 (1) Although the UNESCO Convention was meant to be a legally binding 
instrument, in fact, it has precious few obligations, and these are formulated as 
mere stimuli for the parties to adopt measures protecting cultural diversity at the 
national  8  and international  9  levels. There are only two provisions that can be said 
to be of a binding nature. The first resembles the WTO’s enabling clause  10  and 
relates to the preferential treatment that developed countries must grant to 
cultural workers and cultural goods of developing countries.  11  The second, formu-
lated in Article 17, creates an obligation for international cooperation in situations 
of serious threat to cultural expressions, construed in particular as assistance from 
developed to developing countries. Even this pair of “real” obligations is vague and 
unlikely to bring about radical change; they also appear somewhat marginal to the 
proclaimed goal of cultural diversity. 
 Despite the limited obligations on the parties to take action to protect and 
promote cultural diversity, the UNESCO Convention formulates an extensive 
block of rights to that end. Article 6(2) provides a nonexhaustive list of measures 
that the parties may adopt.  12  The list is virtually all encompassing, ranging from 
the generic “regulatory measures aimed at protecting and promoting diversity of 
cultural expressions”  13  to the concrete example of public service broadcasting.  14  
This all-inclusive approach, adding up to the UNESCO Convention’s broad and 
fuzzy definition of “cultural diversity”  15  and the lack of proportionality or effi-
ciency tests, opens the door to state activism in a wide range of economic sec-
tors that affect culture in one way or another. This situation has been criticized 
both by prominent negotiating parties, notably the United States,  16  and a host of 
scholars,  17  who warn against protectionism and the potential harm to the free flow 
of information. The value added by the convention’s Operational Guidelines in 
assisting efforts to concretize targeted action and ensure balanced choices can be 
deemed minimal.  18  The guidelines have remained very general; despite some useful 
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clarifications, they are framed as recommendations and are ultimately unlikely to 
strongly influence the actual implementation by the ratifying members. 
 (2) As well as the missing obligations and implementation criteria, one should 
note that the framework of the UNESCO Convention is not comprehensive enough 
to secure the protection and promotion of cultural diversity, as it leaves some crit-
ical elements outside its otherwise generously defined scope of application. Some 
of these missing pieces are related to the centrality of state sovereignty, which is 
intrinsic to the UNESCO Convention, as all rights and obligations stemming from 
the convention are attributed to states.  19  While this is understandable for an inter-
governmental treaty, cultural rights do not correspond to national boundaries.  20  
Quite the contrary, it needs to be acknowledged that many of the processes of cul-
tural homogenization have occurred precisely because of state-led policies aimed 
at cultural standardization and an overlap between state and culture, whereby the 
goal has frequently been to impose the culture of dominant elites on the rest of the 
citizenry.  21  
 The fact that the UNESCO Convention subscribes to respecting and safeguard-
ing human rights and fundamental freedoms  22  may partly remedy this situation. 
Still, it is somewhat disappointing that specific cultural rights—such as access to 
education or use of language of choice—did not make it into the text,  23  in par-
ticular since they were acknowledged by the earlier but nonbinding UNESCO 
Declaration on Cultural Diversity.  24  Neither are the specific rights of indigenous 
peoples  25  nor those of media organizations, journalists, or individuals appropri-
ately safeguarded. 
 A vital element omitted from the regulatory domain of the UNESCO Conven-
tion, except for the brief remark in the preamble,  26  is intellectual property rights 
(IPRs). This omission is odd, since IPRs have as their core objective the protection 
and promotion of creativity and innovation, and are thus an indispensable element 
of all processes related to the creation of, distribution of, and access to cultural 
content.  27  
 (3) A significant drawback of the convention in terms of the critical role it was 
supposed to play as a counterforce to economic globalization (as epitomized by 
the WTO) is its “conflict of laws” provision.  28  This crucial norm, as provided by 
Article 20 of the UNESCO Convention, fails to ensure any meaningful interface 
with the rules of the WTO (or any of the other existing international agreements) 
in case of a conflict between them.  29  Article 20 provides simultaneously that 
“[n]othing in this Convention shall be interpreted as modifying rights and obligations 
of the Parties under any other treaties to which they are parties,”  30  and that “with-
out subordinating this Convention to any other treaty,” Parties shall foster mutual 
supportiveness between the convention and the other treaties to which they are 
parties.  31  Even without lengthy deliberations on the possible implementation and 
interpretation scenarios,  32  it is evident that this rather paradoxical formulation 
involves no modification of rights and obligations of the parties under other exist-
ing treaties.  33  For some of them, such as notably the harmonized enforceable IPRs 
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under the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPs), any modification appears outright impossible. 
 To sum up the critique of the UNESCO Convention’s text, one can maintain 
that it is an instrument of soft rather than hard law,  34  which largely evades contro-
versies and while affirming state sovereignty in cultural policy matters, fails to pro-
vide adequate guidance on how to design appropriate, future-oriented instruments 
capable of protecting and promoting cultural diversity in a world of profound rule 
fragmentation and complexity and of rapid technological change.  35  Alternatively, 
one might venture to suggest that what made the adoption of the UNESCO 
Convention possible emptied it of some of its stronger and more valuable content. 
This is proof of the complexity of the issues that arise whenever cultural diversity is 
to be addressed. The convention’s less than bold text is also the result of the starkly 
different sensibilities and motivation of the parties when drafting an international 
instrument on cultural matters.  36  In practical terms, the role of the United States 
in diluting the substance of the UNESCO Convention by ingeniously making it 
broader, fuzzier, and less binding has also to be acknowledged. 
 2.  THE IMPACT OF THE UNESCO CONVENTION 
 Thinking beyond the convention’s textual basis, it is important to ask what its 
impact is. This question must be addressed through careful consideration of the 
record of implementation activities so far, but also more crucially, against the 
backdrop of the international regime complexity,  37  to which the UNESCO 
Convention was a reaction and in which it is now embedded. It is important to 
note in the latter context that although the negotiation processes, which lead  to an 
agreement, are certainly critical for the agreement’s clout, “political deals often get 
redefined during implementation because the actors who implement agreements 
have different priorities and are subject to different pressures than are the policymakers 
who designed the deal in the first place.”  38  This could be particularly true for the 
UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity, as international regime complexity 
has in effect reduced the clarity of its legal obligations and introduced overlapping 
sets of rules that govern, among others, issues of culture and trade, culture 
and intellectual property, or culture and human rights, as already observed in the 
preceding section. We find the theoretical framework of international regime com-
plexity, which examines the existing multiple, overlapping, and nonhierarchical 
regimes, as particularly fitting to capture the many facets and directions of the 
UNESCO Convention’s effects. This framework would suggest that “where state 
preferences are similar, lawyers overcome fragmentation by crafting agreements 
that resolve conflicts across regimes, and thus legal ambiguity is transitory. Where 
preferences diverge, states block attempts to clarify the rules, and thus ambiguity 
persists, allowing countries to select their preferred rule or interpretation.”  39  
 In the following, we test whether the latter conjecture has been proven in the 
past five years. We also look at the effect the UNESCO Convention on Cultural 
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Diversity has had on other regimes, notably the international trade regime, as it is 
here that the major impact was intended at the time that the cultural proponents 
changed the venue from the WTO to UNESCO.  40  We also look at some concrete 
implementation initiatives under the auspices of the convention itself and in its 
ratifying members, and try to assess them in context. 
 2.1.  The UNESCO Convention’s Impact Vis-à-Vis the WTO 
 Despite the impressive number of states that have ratified the convention, and thus 
have arguably committed themselves to the objective of protecting and promoting 
cultural diversity, the impact of the UNESCO Convention on the WTO regime 
is to be judged as minimal. What is observable above all is an affirmation of the 
status quo,  41  which has been characterized by the legacy line of separation between 
the European Union (EU) and the United States with their respective proculture 
and protrade positions, if we are to describe them in a typified manner,  42  and the 
existence of diverse smaller clusters of countries with less strongly voiced opinions. 
 The success of the adoption of the UNESCO Convention cannot mask the 
political economy behind it and the fact that different states have ratified it for 
very different reasons.  43  Although the Canadian and French delegations,  44  assisted 
by a number of NGOs, were fairly efficient during the convention’s negotiation,  45  
this mobilization is not strong enough to go beyond the weak regulatory charge of 
the UNESCO Convention and to matter when “real” trade interests are at stake. 
At present, it is highly unlikely that a negotiating bloc will form within the WTO 
to push for more culture-oriented solutions—such as including some sort of 
“cultural exception,”  46  an express clause for culture in the general exception pro-
visions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (Article XX) and 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)  (Article XIV), or including 
cultural diversity as one of the objectives of the WTO in the Preamble of the WTO 
Agreement.  47  This is evident from the current state of trade talks, as launched 
under the Doha Development Agenda in 2001.  48  
 Although Doha has not stalled because of the trade-versus-culture debate, 
the requests and offers tabled so far reveal precious few new commitments and 
no future-oriented rules design that could address cultural matters at their inter-
section with economic interests. This is particularly palpable in the audiovisual 
services sector, which has been the most contentious in this clash and is likely to 
remain the service sector with the fewest commitments even after a successful 
completion of the Doha round.  49  Despite the recognition widely shared by key 
WTO members that the audiovisual sector has changed dramatically,  50  in particular 
in the face of the convergence of the information technology, telecommunications, 
and media sectors, and due to the sweeping transformations caused by the Inter-
net, there is little agreement on the way forward. The trade-versus-culture status 
quo has indeed been perpetuated through the UNESCO Convention. This has had 
multiple (primarily negative) effects for the WTO outside the narrow domain of 
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audiovisual services. The spillover effects are felt in the discussions on advancing 
liberalization and coherent global regulation in the “neighboring” areas of tele-
communications and electronic commerce.  51  Overall, the WTO, in many senses, 
is rendered unable to appropriately address trade in the Internet age,  52  despite the 
organization’s inherent flexibility and potential to adapt.  53  
 Against the backdrop of this political deadlock, many observers had been hoping 
that when a new trade-versus-culture case emerged, the WTO adjudication—a 
uniquely powerful mechanism of dispute resolution at the international level  54  —
would provide a final resolution to the conflict, while possibly also clarifying the 
status of the UNESCO Convention and its relationship with the WTO rules.  55  
The  China–Publications and Audiovisual Products case,  56  decided in favor of the 
United States in 2009, proved the contrary. In this particular case, China tried to 
justify diverse measures in the media domain by invoking the UNESCO Conven-
tion and the related UNESCO Declaration on Cultural Diversity.  57  The panel was 
not sympathetic to this attempt and recalled that “the UNESCO Convention 
expressly provides: ‘Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as modifying 
the rights and obligations of the parties under any other treaties to which they 
are parties.’”  58  The panel went on to say that “[i]n any event, nothing in the text 
of the WTO Agreement provides an exception from WTO disciplines in terms 
of ‘cultural goods,’ and China’s Accession Protocol likewise contains no such 
exception.”  59  Thus, China’s attempt to apply the UNESCO Convention as a shield 
remained futile—a position that was also supported by the Appellate Body, despite 
China’s request to the Appellate Body to be “mindful”  60  of the specific dual nature 
of cultural goods and services. 
 Interestingly, the panel did leave the door open for further consideration of 
cultural concerns, as it interpreted broadly Article XX(a) GATT, which justifies 
measures violating rules of the WTO Agreements when these measures serve the 
protection of public morals.  61  It acknowledged China’s claim that “reading materials 
and finished audiovisual products are so-called ‘cultural goods’” and these are 
“of a unique kind with a potentially serious negative impact on public morals.”  62  
Despite the fact that the panel found the measures at issue not “necessary within the 
meaning of Article XX(a),”  63  this may be interpreted as newly enhanced flexibility 
of the WTO rules with regard to culture, which can be used in the future. 
 2.2.  The UNESCO Convention’s Impact Outside the WTO 
 The standstill in the WTO in trade and culture matters, which has only been 
confirmed by the UNESCO Convention, has had repercussions outside the WTO. 
The example with digital trade and the inability of the WTO to tackle the relevant 
questions because of the issue overlaps with culture is illuminating. It is symptom-
atic of the overall intensified power plays, which led  to increased fragmentation of 
both negotiation themes and of negotiation fora. The lack of solutions within the 
WTO context has driven and will continue to drive members to take the bilateral 
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or regional paths to advance their policy priorities. The United States in particular has 
made substantial efforts to ensure implementation of its digital agenda  64  through a 
number of free trade agreements (FTAs). The agreements reached since 2002 with 
Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Morocco, Oman, Peru, Singapore, the Central American 
countries,  65  and most recently with Panama, Colombia, and South Korea, contain 
only minimal restrictions on digital products, applying a negative scheduling 
approach (in contrast to the standard GATS positive pick-and-choose mode) and 
also tackle some “deep” e-commerce regulatory issues.  66  
 Interestingly in this exercise, the United States has shown some deference to the 
culturally inspired measures of its FTA partners in the field of audiovisual services 
and permitted the policy space needed for these measures. The measures are, 
however, frozen at their present level.  67  Moreover, they could only relate to 
conventional offline technologies. It is also noteworthy that the leeway given to the 
U.S. partners with respect to trade in cultural products tends to reflect the negoti-
ating capacity of the states involved—the smaller the country, the more concessions 
it makes.  68  Policy room thus may often be substantially reduced, and countries 
(especially the poorer ones) may not be able to appropriately cater for diverse 
public interests in the field of media—particularly digital media—in effect con-
straining the possibilities for implementing the UNESCO Convention in the said 
domains. 
 Before looking at the implementation activities of the convention’s parties, we 
can sum up at this stage by saying that the UNESCO Convention has had a certain 
impact on the international regime complex. In the specific case of starkly diverging 
positions of the EU and the United States on the matters of trade and culture, 
the theoretical conjecture that ambiguity would persist has by and large been 
confirmed. Further, it appears that the deadlock in the WTO realm with regard to 
cultural products and services may have led to overall greater uncertainty and 
unpredictability regarding the WTO trade liberalization commitments and the 
ways forward, both in terms of future commitments and rules design. As Shaffer 
and Pollack contend, and as the  China–Audiovisual case mentioned earlier proves, 
this may be related to a process of “softening” the hard law of the WTO.  69  
Importantly, as the distributive conflict between the United States and the EU 
continues, the UNESCO and the WTO regimes are highly unlikely to “converge 
into a new synthesis, but rather will remain in conflict for a prolonged period.”  70  
 The impact of the convention on UNESCO (its own parent organization) and 
UNESCO’s authority can be deemed sizeable , as it has subsequently become a hub 
of new activities. The UNESCO Convention has also effectively contributed to 
promoting the notion of cultural diversity and establishing it as a global public 
good—that is, as a regulatory objective worth pursuing in a wide range of activities 
and venues, both domestically and internationally. To be sure, the convention has 
mobilized international cooperation, although the overall impact of the activities it 
has triggered may be small in practical terms, as we discuss in the next section, and 
the question of whether this development can be sustained remains open. 
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 3.  IMPLEMENTATION INITIATIVES 
 While looking at the UNESCO Convention’s text, we have already alluded to its 
low legal charge and the many ambiguities (in definitions, actions, and regime 
interfaces, among others) it contains. It should be added that this state of normative 
incompleteness is exacerbated by the lack of institutional or adjudicatory mech-
anisms that could procedurally clarify and complete the contract over time. The 
convention’s own dispute settlement is not compulsory. Negotiation, good offices, 
and mediation are the preferred modes of settling a disagreement. The possibility 
for a conciliation procedure exists, but the parties must only consider in good 
faith the proposal made by the Conciliation Commission, and a party may at any 
time declare that it does not recognize the conciliation procedure as a method 
of dispute resolution.  71  The Intergovernmental Committee, which comprises 
24 members elected on the principles of equitable geographical representation and 
rotation and which serves as the executive body of the convention, is also insuffi-
ciently empowered. The Intergovernmental Committee’s competencies, as defined 
in Article 23(6), do not provide a solid legal basis to enable it to engage in inter-
pretation of the convention beyond preparing the operational guidelines (which 
have, however, to be approved by all the members) and commenting on the state 
reports (which are, however, prepared by the states themselves).  72  It should also be 
stressed that the UNESCO Convention provides for no sanctions or other strong 
control mechanisms—failure to fulfill any of the obligations could at worst result 
in a state being criticized by the Intergovernmental Committee and the Conference 
of Parties on the basis of its own report.  73  This may carry some reputational costs,  74  
but is not comparable to the hard and enforceable sanctions of the WTO dispute 
settlement. 
 To be sure, this operational deficiency compounds the relative weakness of the 
convention’s text and substantially lowers the expectations in terms of imple-
mentation activities. It should also be stressed that since the UNESCO Conven-
tion was initially conceived as a counterreaction to the harder rules of the WTO 
Agreements and more generally to the deep processes of economic globalization, 
its main implementation thrust has always been perceived to be in external affairs 
rather than in a state’s own domestic cultural policy.  75  An analysis of the UNESCO 
Convention and its implications in the Arab world, for instance, revealed that the 
Arab states almost completely disregard its domestic dimension:
 While Arab governments have adopted the Convention, they have a 
tendency to regard it more as a means through which they can gain 
recognition in the global arena rather than as a guiding document for 
internal policy-making, particularly because they are conscious that 
opening the door to cultural pluralism will naturally lead to a political 
pluralism that they would much rather delay.  76  
 Considering the diversity of states that have ratified the convention, many of which 
have bad democratic and human rights records, this statement is possibly valid for 
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0940739113000209
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 14:34:25, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
THE UNESCO CONVENTION ON CULTURAL DIVERSITY  365 
other regions too. It is hard to imagine that countries like China, Syria, Afghanistan, 
Rwanda, or Saudi Arabia will all of a sudden subscribe to a higher standard in pro-
tecting cultural rights and promoting diversity. In addition, many of the members 
fall into the least developed or very poor developing countries category (e.g., Nigeria, 
Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Haiti), and simply lack the finances to take any action. 
 This said, we can nonetheless expect some progress in implementation, especially 
by those states that have been at the forefront of the culture versus trade battle 
from the very outset and that have fervently worked towards the convention’s 
adoption and ratification. The EU and its Member States are in this sense the obvious 
front-runners. We thus concentrate in the following above all on the implemen-
tation record of the EU, using not only the data provided in the context of the 
UNESCO Convention but also additional data and more in-depth analysis avail-
able on the EU’s cultural policy at home and abroad. Where relevant, we take up 
instances from other countries, using the data made available in their quadrennial 
periodic reports, as required by the UNESCO Convention and submitted by 
48 parties in 2012, some 25 of which are non-EU and 21 non-European countries.  77  
 3.1.  In External Affairs 
 As the recently submitted country reports reveal, there have been a number of 
activities on the international scene related to the UNESCO Convention’s imple-
mentation. The major thrust is on international cooperation. Worth noting is 
that the focus of international cultural cooperation activities by the parties has 
expanded geographically over the past 20 years (with a new focus on Brazil, China, 
and India). Even more importantly, there has been a shift from “purely ‘promotional’ 
activities (showcasing the cultural heritage of one country in another) to those that 
facilitate cooperation in specific cultural industry sectors as well as on concrete 
cultural policy themes or related projects.”  78  Culture has become one of the 
underlying objectives in international frameworks, strategies, and programs 
of several parties, in particular in the specific context of cultural cooperation for 
development (as provided for in Article 14 UNESCO Convention).  79  This includes 
not only capacity building, training, and technology transfer but also newer forms 
of bilateral and multilateral cooperation that aim to support cultural and creative 
industries in developing countries, which facilitate the flow of cultural goods and 
services and the mobility of artists and creators worldwide.  80  
 While the number and the diversity of these activities may be impressive, it 
should be said that many of them are smaller-scale projects without sizeable budgets 
and they may often be of limited duration.  81  Even the convention’s own International 
Fund for Cultural Diversity (IFCD), established under Article 18, is not well 
enough endowed to support larger initiatives, as its resources consist of voluntary 
contributions made by the parties and gifts from other countries, organizations, 
and individuals.  82  If we contemplate the convention’s impact in the longer run, it 
may be that this aid is found to be insufficient by developing countries, especially 
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0940739113000209
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 14:34:25, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
 366  MIRA BURRI
those who were not strong cultural proponents to begin with; these countries may 
choose the benefits from trade and seek real market access concessions. Such an 
aspiration would not be utterly misplaced, as “even a cursory look at international 
trade in cultural products shows” that, “developed countries at the forefront of 
efforts to ‘protect’ cultural diversity are at the forefront of cultural trade as well.”  83  
 Still, these activities endorsed under the auspices of the UNESCO Convention 
should not be underestimated. They significantly raise the awareness of cultural 
diversity as a policy objective, as well as the awareness of cultural diversity policies, 
and move towards establishing best practices.  84  They mobilize an expanding 
network of actors at all levels of government, including many NGOs—some 
already existing (such as the network of European Union National Institutes for 
Culture  85  ), others specifically founded for the purpose (such as the Global Alliance 
for Cultural Diversity  86  )—as well as actors from the cultural industries. None of 
the initiatives so far, however, amounts to a legal or policy reform; neither does any 
initiative expressly seek an interface with the trade regime. 
 One model that stands out for its innovative design and possibly further-reaching 
effects is that of the Protocols on Cultural Cooperation, negotiated by the European 
Commission on behalf of the EU and its Member States. The protocols are, on 
the one hand, a direct implementation effort of the UNESCO Convention; on the 
other hand, they are responses to broader changes in the EU’s external policies. 
These changes relate to the extended competencies of the EU  in matters of common 
commercial policy after the Lisbon Treaty,  87  as well as more specifically to the EU’s 
repositioning with regard to new regional or bilateral agreements having an 
economic integration dimension.  88  This latter foresees notably that audiovisual 
services (including the content-related implications of electronic commerce) 
should be excluded from the scope of such trade agreements, and that audiovisual 
and other cultural services should receive special treatment under dedicated 
cooperation frameworks.  89  
 The first Protocol on Cultural Cooperation was signed in the context of the 
Economic Partnership Agreement with the Caribbean Forum of African, Caribbean 
and Pacific States (CARIFORUM)  90  in 2008, its negotiation having started before 
the UNESCO Convention was ratified by the EU and before its entry into force. 
The second effort, which has been slightly calibrated,  91  was the Protocol with South 
Korea. The most recent examples relate to the EU trade agreement with Colombia 
and Peru and the EU–Central America Association Agreement, both initiated in 
2011, and both of which include cultural cooperation provisions.  92  
 The protocols are not uniform but rather are tailored to the specific circumstances 
of the partner.  93  Typical of all, however, is the attempt to interface trade and culture, 
and this is no trivial matter: “The inclusion of language on cultural coopera-
tion matters marks a significant evolution in EU attitudes towards the subject 
matter in a trade policy context, hitherto marked by a desire to preserve max-
imum policy autonomy by eschewing any commitments in trade agreements 
and, in the case of the DDA [Doha Development Agenda], by refusing to direct 
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negotiating requests to its trading partners and to entertain offers in response 
to trading partner requests in cultural industries.”  94  Although the EU does 
not expressly grant new market commitments, in many senses the protocols 
improve access to the EU market, especially with regard to the temporary entry 
of natural persons and the treatment of cultural industries.  95  In effect, such 
provisions allow preferential treatment under the exception of Article V GATS 
for economic integration, and thus again have an impact on global trade and 
global trade regulation.  96  
 Far-reaching has also been the commitment inscribed in the EU-CARIFORUM 
and the EU–Korea Protocols, whereby coproductions qualify as “European works” 
in the sense of the EU Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD),  97  and thus 
can benefit from various quota and other support schemes made available in the 
EU, in particular from the majority broadcasting quota.  98  This obligation is reciprocal, 
and European producers can enjoy the same treatment in the partner country.  99  
 The Protocols on Cultural Cooperation have been subject to some criticism, in 
particular by France and the European Coalitions for Cultural Diversity. Among 
other things,  100  they have argued that the European Commission is stretching its 
competences by incorporating culture into trade negotiations through the back 
door, while cultural affairs still primarily fall into the policy domain of the Member 
States. They also fear that the trade and culture linkage goes against the spirit of the 
UNESCO Convention and may in fact harm cultural diversity.  101  
 Regardless of whether this critique is unfounded (and it probably is),  102  the EU 
has softened its approach in the last two cultural cooperation agreements, as they 
are not directly tied to the trade agreement, which has been negotiated in parallel, 
and do not include the controversial coproduction recognition as domestic works, 
which offers a deeper market access and a sizeable package of benefits, otherwise 
available only to audiovisual works made with European money.  103  
 3.2.  At Home 
 As we noted earlier, the UNESCO Convention is fairly vague on what exactly is 
to be done to secure its appropriate implementation. The convention’s reporting 
framework was slightly more specific in showing what is expected, at least for the 
purposes of reporting. It requested information on the measures that the parties 
have put in place to promote the diversity of cultural expressions at the different 
stages of creation, production, distribution, dissemination, and participation. As 
such, these measures were meant to be understood as those that nurture creativity 
and form part of an enabling environment for independent producers and distrib-
utors working in the cultural industries, as well as measures that provide access for 
the public at large to diverse cultural expressions.  104  Actions that fall under these 
categories and have been undertaken by the parties include direct financial support 
to artists (majority of reporting parties); legislation on the status of the artist (e.g., 
Austria, Canada, Germany, Lithuania, Namibia, Mongolia, Montenegro, Norway, 
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and Peru); incubator schemes for young artists and female artists (e.g., Austria); 
support for artists’ mobility, particularly in a regional or subregional context (e.g., 
Bolivia, Chile, Cyprus, and the EU); establishing artists’ residencies (Argentina 
and Tunisia), as well as support for the better use of copyright mechanisms (e.g., 
Denmark, Greece, Namibia, Oman, Slovenia, and the EU).  105  In addition, there 
have been a number of training and education programs  106  and a great variety of 
initiatives that can be considered as forming part of an enabling environment for 
the production and distribution of cultural goods and services. On the production 
side, they encompass direct funding for the production of domestic cultural con-
tent (majority of reporting parties); support for the creation and functioning of 
production infrastructures and entities such as cultural industry companies or 
networks (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Ecuador, Estonia, France, 
Germany, Monaco, Paraguay, and the EU); workshops on production competencies 
and individual entrepreneurial skills (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, and Peru); schemes 
that collect levies on the revenues of public and private cultural industries to reinvest 
into national productions (e.g., Poland); and coproduction schemes (e.g., the EU 
and its Member States). Frequently reported distribution measures were local or 
national schemes to build up distributional and marketing capacities in cultural 
production (e.g., Austria, Brazil, Cyprus, Ecuador, Estonia, Mongolia, Nigeria, 
Slovakia, Tunisia, and the EU); development of local distribution mechanisms 
including the creation of physical infrastructure (e.g., Montenegro); content quotas 
(e.g., Canada, France, and Portugal); measures to promote the export of cultural 
goods and services (e.g., Austria, Argentina, Canada, Estonia, Finland, Oman, and 
Tunisia); media policies, including the promotion of public service media and 
of diversity therein (e.g., Austria, Argentina, Denmark, France, Montenegro, Norway, 
Peru, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and Uruguay); and support for 
promotional events such as “markets,” “fairs,” “festivals,” or “years” (e.g., Argentina, 
Ecuador, Estonia, Greece, Montenegro, and Peru).  107  
 A number of the reported cultural measures focus on the audience side and are 
intended to ensure the public’s participation in cultural life as a means to enhance 
the overall quality of life. Such interventions have been made with a view to 
promoting cultural and media literacy (majority of reporting parties); promoting 
the access and participation of minorities, indigenous peoples, young people, and 
women in cultural life (majority of reporting parties); promoting access and 
participation of the socially disadvantaged, the disabled and the elderly (e.g., Norway, 
Portugal, and Spain); and lowering price barriers to access to cultural goods 
through diverse measures, such as reduced taxes (e.g., the EU Member States).  108  
 Overall until now, it appears that the bulk of the action has been on fostering the 
distribution and enjoyment of cultural goods and services; the policy objectives of 
creation and production are common but less prevalent.  109  Importantly, institutional 
policies were the most common type of policies and measures adopted by the 
reporting convention’s parties. Almost all parties have established national institutes 
to promote the cultural industries or a particular industry, created departments 
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or institutes of the Ministry of Culture to promote cultural expressions of persons 
belonging to minorities, or, in some cases, established a Ministry of Culture.  110  
 In all these activities, a key question that can be raised when attempting to 
assess the impact of the UNESCO Convention, as well as the progress made in its 
implementation, is that of the  causal link between the convention and the manifold 
interventions in the field of cultural policy, some of which clearly predate the con-
vention’s entry into force. With regard to the EU, which we somewhat singled out 
as a reference point in our analysis, this question is particularly pertinent. 
 Despite the EU’s  limited competence in matters of culture,  111  it has a consider-
able number of actions in place in the field of culture, encompassing internal policy 
measures in the domains of (1) culture, education and youth; (2) communication; 
(3) regional policy; (4) agriculture and sustainable development; (5) employment, 
social affairs, and equal opportunities; (6) the audiovisual sector; (7) information 
society and research; (8) competition policy; (9) internal market; and (10) mari-
time policy.  112  In addition, pursuant to Article 167 Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU) (formerly Article 154 EC), the EU has committed to 
continued efforts to mainstream culture in all its activities.  113  This certainly reflects 
the spirit and the letter of the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity. On 
the other hand, despite the fact that the EU has this advanced package of internal 
policies related to culture, it has not taken any decisive  new action for the protec-
tion and promotion of cultural diversity. We have argued elsewhere  114  that in 
particular in the field of digital media, its current instruments are outdated.  115  In 
its report to the UNESCO Convention’s Intergovernmental Committee, the EU 
and its Member States did admit that there is “a certain difficulty in distinguishing 
the achievements specifically linked to the implementation of the Convention 
from those related to their existing cultural policies.”  116  
 Overall, it appears that for the parties, which already had the necessary structures 
and policies in place, the convention’s implementation has meant supplementing 
existing policies rather than making a major policy shift.  117  It has been argued that 
the UNESCO Convention has nonetheless introduced “a new perspective and 
reference framework to cultural policy debates.”  118  For parties with less developed 
structures, the convention has more tangibly spurred the active development of 
cultural policies and the strengthening of their cultural industries.  119  
 4.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 As Kal Raustiala and others maintain, we must distinguish between the compliance 
with a certain legal instrument and its effectiveness.  120  Raustiala argues that
 compliance as a concept draws no causal linkage between a legal rule and 
behavior, but simply identifies a conformity between the rule and behavior. 
To speak of effectiveness is to speak directly of causality: to claim that a 
rule is ‘effective’ is to claim that it led to certain behaviors or outcomes, 
which may or may not meet the legal standard of compliance.  121  
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 In this sense, we can contend that the UNESCO Convention has been complied 
with, and there are a host of activities in both domestic and international contexts 
that can offer proof of its advancing implementation. We are, however, less certain 
of the effectiveness of the UNESCO Convention in protecting and promoting the 
diversity of cultural expressions. We observed that the influence of the convention 
on the international regime complex where it is situated has been minimal, and 
no working interface between the trade and the cultural regimes has emerged; 
indeed, the venue shopping from the WTO to UNESCO on the occasion of the 
convention’s adoption may have exacerbated the conflict and perpetuated the 
“cultural exception” status quo. While international cooperation has been spurred 
under the auspices of the UNESCO Convention, in particular in the field of coop-
eration for development, the implications of this for the overall regime complex 
may also be marginal, as cooperation pledges are not far-reaching and/or are 
insufficiently funded. The EU experiment with the Protocols on Cultural Cooper-
ation can be seen as an innovative step, but it has been controversial especially with 
regard to linking cultural and trade activities and agreements. Bearing in mind that 
the intended focus of the UNESCO Convention has always been on external affairs, 
the status of implementation domestically disappoints less. It is hard to draw 
the line between those instruments and interventions that have been specifically 
designed to address the convention’s (admittedly vague) objectives and the “business 
as usual” in national cultural policies. Positive achievements should be seen in the 
development of best practices, the building of statistical resources, and the impact 
assessments of the tools applied, which may in the longer run improve the effi-
ciency of the measures and dispel some of the protectionist fears the convention 
has instilled. 
 To conclude, it is perhaps too early to judge the impact of the UNESCO Conven-
tion as only five years have passed since its entry into force. First, it does take time 
for those newly installed agencies, networks, and institutes to work. Second, it has 
been argued that a full implementation of the convention should not focus exclu-
sively on technical and financial aspects, such as capacity building, coproduction, 
or project funding but “embrace its political dimension as well, including strength-
ening civil society, access to the media, the place of independent creativity in the 
public realm.”  122  Areas such as the integration of culture in sustainable develop-
ment or in preferential treatment also arguably call for longer-term adjustments.  123  
The same may be true for the evolution of international regime complexity. “As 
the number of countries ratifying the Convention grows, the Convention, together 
with the 2001 UNESCO Universal Declaration, could be viewed as emerging 
customary international law that applies to all nations except those nonsignatories 
who persistently object to it,”  124  and we have yet to see the repercussions of 
this evolution. The concept of “cultural diversity,” as interpreted beyond the 
narrow trade versus culture context,  125  can also prove powerful enough to mobilize 
broader and innovative tools in cultural policymaking at all levels of governance.  126  
Only time will show whether these expectations can be met. 
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  87 .  Pursuant to Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), EU 
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and (3) ensure a full institutional separation for the Protocol from the general dispute settlement 
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procity and balance than the EU–CARIFORUM Protocol, which is asymmetrical in nature. 
  92 .  Albeit, not in a strictly protocol form: While the agreements on cultural cooperation were 
still negotiated simultaneously with the trade agreements, they are not annexed to them. As no pref-
erential treatment of coproductions is envisaged, the agreements are disconnected from the trade 
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  95 .  Sauvé and Ward, “The EC–CARIFORUM,” 58. 
  96 .  See Cottier and Molinuevo, “Article V.” 
  97 .  Article 1(n) of Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by 
law, regulation, or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media 
services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive), OJ L 95/1, 15 April 2010 (hereinafter “AVMSD”). 
  98 .  Article 16 AVMSD (previously Article 4 Television without Frontiers Directive) that Member 
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  99 .  Troussard et al., “Article 16,” 449–50. 
  100 .  For an overview of the various strands of critique, see Loisen and De Ville, “The EU-Korea 
Protocol,” 260–65. 
  101 .  Loisen and De Ville “The EU–Korea Protocol,” 255; also Loisen et al., “Mainstreaming EU 
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“Trade and Culture in International Law.” 
  103 .  On the definition and critique of the concept of “European work,” see Burri, “The Reform of 
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para. 10. 
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para. 15. 
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  107 .  Intergovernmental Committee, “Strategic and Action-Oriented Analytic Summary,” annex 1, 
para. 17. 
  108 .  Intergovernmental Committee, “Strategic and Action-Oriented Analytic Summary,” annex 1, 
para. 19. 
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para. 85. See also European Commission, “Report on Measures,” 3; European Commission, 
“Quadrennial Periodic Report.” 
  118 .  Intergovernmental Committee, “Strategic and Action-Oriented Analytic Summary,” annex 1, 
para. 85, referring to Austria’s quadrennial periodic report, 19. 
  119 .  As noted earlier, most of the achievements were of institutional nature. Parties reported about 
having established national institutes to promote specific cultural industries, created departments or 
institutes of the Ministry of Culture to promote cultural expressions of minorities or, in some cases, 
established for the first time a separate Ministry of Culture (e.g., in Bolivia and Ecuador). More fun-
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  120 .  Raustiala and Victor, “Conclusions,” 684–86; Raustiala and Slaughter, “International Law, 
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Policies,” 21. 
  123 .  European Parliament, “The Implementation of the UNESCO Convention in the EU’s External 
Policies,” 11. Article 13 UNESCO Convention stipulates that, “Parties shall endeavour to integrate 
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  124 .  Shaffer and Pollack, “Hard vs. Soft Law,” 772. 
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